Izlag an je sa zn an stv en o g sk u p a P rim lje n o : 1988 -02-05 I t h as been claim ed th a t possible w o rld sem an tics is in a p p ro p ri ate for th e re p re se n ta tio n of m en tal contents, beacause of it p resu m e d e x te rn a list bias. In th e a rtic le it is show n th a t possible w o rld p ro v i des a tool flexible enough to serve in th e discussions a b o u t content.
Does one need logic in doing philosophy of mind or philosophy of psychology?
Some time ago it was thought that epistemic logic -logic of belief and knowledge -and logical semantics for propositional attitudes is almost an obligatory form at for work in th e philosophy of mind, and the possible world semantics was the most common fram ework used for this sort of research. Recently, the trend has been reversed, and many researches tend simply to bypass the logical issues involved ,in their methods and results.
It seems th at part of the reason for this change of, attitude is the feeling that possible world semantics is to rigid to adress the interesting issues in the field. Take the central topic of contemporary debate -the issue of the nature of contents of mental states. It is felt, that possible world semantics is too objectivistic, th at it necessarilly represents our propositional contents in an world-oriented or external object-oriented way, thus prejudging the issue in favor of one side in the debate.
I think th a t this opinion is unjustified. In this short article I shall try to retell some im portant stories from th e relevant philosophical lite rature, recasting them in very simple terms of epistemic logic. I hope to show that the debate around the notions of »wide« are »narrow« content can be profitably lead in the language of usual modal logic, and I shall propose in a semi-formal way, a class of models which are suitable for this (noble) purpose, Here is one way to motivate the idea of »narrow content«. Start from the class of verbs the psychological explantation is concerned with: doing, tryng, seeing, perceiving, believing, knowing. All of these tell us something about the agent: »Peter saw an aligator« if true, inform us about Peter. Some of those also tell us something about the world )minus the agent): »Peter broke the window« tells us th a t the window was bro ken, »Peter knows th a t it rains« tells us th a t it rains. Call the last ones »ontologicaly commited verbs«, and the ones which do not entail anything about the world »ontologically not-commital verbs«. »To believe« is not commital, »to know« is committal. Now, some committal verbs, like »to know« have been for a long time submitted to a kand of analisies which treats »John knows that p« as equivalent (or even synonimous) with a conjunction of »Jonh believes that p« »p is true« and of some furteh sentence imposing additional constraints on John beliefs (that they be justified, or tracking the truth or whatever). Some authors (notably H. P. Grice) have analysed percep tion verbs in the similar way: if John (veridicaly) sees s tree, then he is in a perceptual state P, there is a tree, and there is some further conection between the tree and Johns being in P. Some others have offered a similar analysis of action verb (notably D. A rm strong): doing r means tryng to r plus succeeding. »Being in P«, and »tryng to r« are non-commital.
One important motive for these analysis has been the quest for generality: if John sees a cherry tree, and Paul halucinates a tree of the same apearance, they have something in common, which is thought worth capturing by analysis -they are both in the perceptual state P, only their surroundings are different. Actual methodologies of research into perception give some support to the analysis -if is supposed that a person who has a visual illusion that p is in the same perceptual state as a person who would veridicaly percieve that p, or else we would never be able to learn about normal perception by sturying the mecha nism of illusion.
Suppose we can isolate the class of commital psychological verbs taking th at-clauses as complements. We can represent those verbs as operating on propositions. Let O be a shematic letter (for »onitologically commited«) for such verbs. Then the commitment can be easily expres sed as a constraint on O:
1. T: Op -> p is a theorem e. g. »A believes that it rains« does not ential that it rains. The abo-Let us simbolize non commital verb with N. Then 2. Np -> p is not a theorem. e. g. »A believs th at it rains« does not entail th at it rains. The abo ve-mentioned analysys have the following in common: For ever com mital operation O₁ one looks for its non-commital counterpart kno wing versus believing, doing versus trying, veridival perception versus non-veridical perception etc.
The sought-after non-commital counterpart should have the fol lowing property:
OiP + -> Nip Λ 1 Λ ρ
Where 1 stands for some non-trivial constraint liking Oi to Ni.
In plain philosopher's English, the ontologicaly comittal operator has to be analysed in term s of its non-commitalal counterpart plus sta tem ent that the argument-proposition is true, plus linking conditions: to know th at it rains is to believe that it rains plus it being the case that it rains plus there being some suitable connection between th e belief and the state of affairs.
Suppose th at we can form ulate the logics of O and N as both being classical normal logics, i. e. satisfying the following requirements (where O' stands for both O and N ):
and closed under substituition and modus ponens. Then the difference between O and N steming from the aditional axiom (T) for O:Op-> p would be the fam iliar one matching the contrast between deantic obligation operator and modal necessity operator. Further, ad ding new axioms to OL and NL we would obtain a set of O-logics and set of N-logics, the first being fam iliar KT-logics and the second K-logics It is obvious that K-logics are more general, and in our case this gene rality is essential for psychologists perference for N-type operators, On the level of semantics, we have a nice intuitively acceptable contrast.
Given that Op entails p, and given the format of possible word frames, the tru th of Op entails that p is tru e in the actual world, i. e. that the accessibility relation be reflexive (or, in neghbourhood terms that peV (Op) where V stands for valuation set).
The tru th of Np does not entail the tru th of p, so the accessibility relation need not be reflexive.
An even more general approach would allow different arguments for counterpart operators:
Now we can state the fundam ental assumption presupposed in theo ries of narrow content: 5. FA : Every Oi has a counterpart Ni. It is then usually claimed th at only N-type operators are suitable to figure in psychological explanations.
At this point the natural questions to ask is: given a suitable N, are there any restrictions on p?
The metodical solipsist answers affirm ativelly: Yes, there are im portant restrictions. At th e very least, »p« should contain only term s whose meaning is accessible to the believer, and it should preferably yield a de dicto characterisation of believer's thought.
The science-fiction story which is usually told to present the argu ment is the Twin Earth story. On Twin Eearth everything ,is the same as here, only the water is replaced by a substance XYZ, called on Twin Earth »water« which is phenomenally indistinguishable from water. Now Jonh, ignorant of chemistry, thinks a thought »Lo, water!«, and Twin John thinks the thought he would express by saying »Lo, water!«.
How should we represent John's belief content?
The proposal which is now fairly accepted in possible world-tradi tion, and which I will call Standard Proposal (SP) for short wants us to identify the proposition believed with the set of worlds such th at if the proposition p is expressed by a sentence s then p is the of worlds at which s is true (more generaly, for any formula j th e set of worlds which satisfy the formula). An exemplary defence of Standard Proposal is to be found in Stalnakers recent book »Inquiry«.
Let us call set of worlds in which s ils tru e (set of s -worlds) pro position p and w rite p for it. Now, it is easy to show th at this picture does mot tell much about issues raised by Twin Earth cases. (B. H. Partee has been one of the first to notice it, witness, Partee, 1979.) . We may show its inadequacy more vividly if we supplement the Twin Earth story w ith one more possibility. On the Earth, H2O is called »water« and looks like water, on the Twin Earth we have a supstance XYZ which looks like water, is called »water«, but is not water. Let us introduce Third Earth, where, due to some electromagnetic forces, H 2O looks violet, stinks, and is not good for people. There it is called »water«.
Suppose now that we want to use FS to represent Jhon's understan ding of the predicte »is water«.
There will be worlds in which John would correctly identify H20 as water. But, not all the worlds with H2O are such worlds. Worlds which contain Third Earth are the worlds in which John, confronted with a sample of H2O (violet, stiking substance) would say: »Oh, no, t h i s definitly is n o t w ater!«.
On the other hand, the worlds which contain Twin Earth are worlds in which John would incorrectly identify XYZ as water. So, of we wan ted to represent John's understanding of the predicate »is water« we would get a picture quite different from the standard proposal.
Here are four possible reactions to this situation. The first reaction is the ortodox one: stick to the Standard Proposal to the bitter end, and try to explain away the Twin Earth intuitions. This is Stalnakers way. It preserves the possible world semantics, and sacrifies a substantial piece of psychology.
The second reaction is to drop possible world semantics as inade quate, and to hope for better solution.
The third reaction is to try to enrich the possible world apparatus in order to capture the subtleties of Johns ref ering to water. N. MIŠČEVIĆ : LOGIC A N D ... RFFZ d, 27(4) (1987/88) The fourth reaction is to build a possible world model in which the reference to the water is absent, and only phenomenally defined predi cates are represented.
The first two reactions are extrem ist. We shall tu rn our attention to the possibilities inherent in the third one.
Let us suppose that John's thoughts are about water. This is the intuition most people have, and it il w orth preserving. On the other hand, the criteria John uses to identify w ater are successful only in cases which are close enough to normal Earth situations -they are not succesfull on Twin Earth nor on Third Earth.
If we w ant to do justice both to John's success and to fallibility of hits criteria we shall have to adopt some version of the Principle of Charity. J. Fodor proposes the following one: »A rough formulation of the Principle of Reasonableness might go: do not be bloody minded in deciding w hat universe of discourse sentences and beliefs will be evaluated with respect to.« (Fodor, 1982, p. 111) .
Fodors own proposal is to tre a t sentences about water as one would treat indexical sentences.
We propose a simple implementation of the Principle of Charity. Let us call a world w epistemically hospitable if it ,is like our world in the following respect: if something si H2O in w than it l o o k s like water, and so on, The animals 'that tre genetically bears look like our bear. There are no pseudo-cats which look like cats but are in fact robots manipulated by Martians.
John certainly would not be fooled in a epistemically hospitable world. He would recognize water for w hat it is.
Ve should evaluate his beliefs in epistemicaly hospitable worlds only. The upshot will be a kind of compromise: his beliefs will tu rn out to refer ho water, but, the limitation of his criteria will be shown in limitations on the cluss of acceptable worlds. (In other worlds, John's success will show on the level of our logical theory, his shortcommings will be encoded on the meta-level, in the formulation of tru th conditions.).
So, let us start from a standard frame F from Standard Proposal: F = (W, R), where W is th e set of possible worlds w (indexed An the usual way), and R is the accessibility relation on W, intuitively under" stood as relating our world wo to all »belief worlds«.
We next introduce a selection function h (to remind of »hospitability«) which select epistemically hospitable worlds. For every formula f w e w ant to select all epistemically hospitable.
There are two ways of doing it. One is to relativise hospitability to formulas, and to say th a t a world is hospitable for a formula f if it does not contain any hidden snares in respect to enities mentioned in the formula. The simpler way is to take the intersection of f-hospitable world for all f, in other words, to tak e woles which are hospitable for all formulas. We t a ke this simpler course (if it turns out that in the end it is too restrictive, cute can easily switch to f-hospitabiliy).
Our selection function h : W -> P (W) selects a subset of epistemi cally hospitable worlds which are R-related to the given world ω . Call this subset H.
Call the restriction of R to H-worlds RH. Now we have a new frame. Call it Hospitable Frame FH . FH = (W. RH)
We can now evaluate sencences like »John believes that w ater is wet« in the Hospitable Frame. Sentence of the form Bap is tru e in FH if it is true in some model in FH. Bap is tru e in model MH from FK if it is true a t some world w0 element of MH.
Bap is true at w0 in MH under valuation υ iff p is true at all RH related worlds (all W1 such that woRH Wi). A formula is valid in M iff it is tru e under all valuation. A for mula is valid in FH iff it is true in all MH elements of FH.
In words, restricting our evaluation to hospitable worlds, we re present the fact that John's thoughts are about water, but we also give due place to the consideration of his recognitional abilites -there are worlds in which John would fail to evaluate his own belief correctly.
Logic should be neutral in respect to competing theories, if it is to be of any help in clarifying them. I hope to have indicated that modal logic and possible world semantics are neutral and flexible enough to allow representation of competing claims in philosophy of psychology, and that this can be done using the most elementary means.
